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This paper explores ways to integrate model uncertainty into policy evaluation.  We first 
describe a general framework for the incorporation of model uncertainty into standard 
econometric calculations.  This framework employs Bayesian model averaging methods that 
have begun to appear in a range of economic studies. Second, we illustrate these general ideas in 
the context of assessment of simple monetary policy rules for some standard New Keynesian 
specifications. The specifications vary in their treatment of expectations as well as in the 
dynamics of output and inflation.  We conclude that the Taylor rule has good robustness 
properties, but may reasonably be challenged in overall quality with respect to stabilization by 
alternative simple rules that also condition on lagged interest rates, even though these rules 
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 The number of separate variables which in any particular social 
phenomenon will determine the result of a given change will as a rule be 
far too large for any human mind to master and manipulate them 
effectively.  In consequence, our knowledge of the principle by which 
these phenomena are produced will rarely if ever enable us to predict the 
precise result of any concrete situation.  While we can explain the 
principle on which certain phenomena are produced and can from this 
knowledge exclude the possibility of certain results…our knowledge will 
in a sense only be negative, i.e. it… will not enable us to narrow the range 









This paper explores issues related to the analysis of government policies in the 
presence of model uncertainty.  Within macroeconomics, increasing attention is being 
given to the positive and normative implications of model uncertainty.  One major 
direction of this work has been initiated by the seminal contributions of Hansen and 
Sargent (2001a,b,2002,2003) on robustness in policy analysis.  Examples of contributions 
to this research program include Giannoni (2002), Marcellino and Salmon (2002), 
Onatksi and Stock (2002) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) and our own Brock 
and Durlauf (2004a,b) and Brock, Durlauf and West (2003).
2  In this approach, model 
uncertainty is defined relative to a given baseline model; specifically, a space of possible 
models is constructed by considering all models that lie within some distance ε  of the 
baseline.  In evaluating policies, the loss associated with a given policy is determined 
relative to the least favorable model in the model space, i.e. preferences are assumed to 
follow a minimax rule with respect to model uncertainty. As such, this program follows 
the approach to decisionmaking initiated by Wald (1950). 
                                                 
1von Hayek (1942, p.290). 
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2A number of the ideas in this literature originally appear in an unpublished working 
paper by Peter von zur Muehlen, reprinted in von zur Muehlen (2001).   2
Our approach to model uncertainty analyzes model spaces that are non-local in 
the sense that we do not require that the different models are close to each other 
according to some metric.  For many macroeconomic contexts, it seems clear that model 
uncertainty is sufficiently severe that very disparate models should be regarded as 
potential candidates for the true or best model.  In the context of monetary policy, there 
has been no resolution of the role of expectations in determining the effects of policies on 
macroeconomic outcomes; some authors favor backward looking models which eschew 
any role for expectations (e.g. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)) while some prefer 
forward looking models, (e.g. Woodford (2003)) and some advocate hybrid models with 
both forward and backwards looking features (e.g. Galí and Gertler (1999)).  Model 
uncertainty also exists within these classes. For the classes of models that employ 
expectations, one finds differences with respect to how they are formulated, with 
disagreement about the use of rational expectations versus survey-based measures, for 
example. Yet another source of differences concerns the dynamic specification of a 
model in terms of lag length structure. 
Formally, we treat uncertainty with respect to the true model in a fashion that is 
symmetric to other forms of uncertainty.  From this perspective, the analysis of policies 
based upon a single model may be thought of as producing conditional probability 
statements in which one of the conditioning elements is the model.  This approach to 
understanding how models effect policy evaluation leads to the use of model averaging 
methods, in which one first evaluates the conditional probability of some unknown object 
of interest given data and a choice of model and second eliminates this conditioning on a 
model by integrating out the model “variable.”  Eliminating this dependence amounts to 
taking weighted averages of the model-specific probabilities, where the weights 
correspond to the probabilities of each model being the correct one.  Model averaging 
represents an important recent development in the statistics literature; major contributions 
include Draper (1995) and Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997).  Model averaging 
methods require the specification of probabilities across models in order to compute 
posterior probabilities concerning parameters or other unknowns (such as forecasts) of 
interest.    3
Within the economics literature, these model averaging methods are achieving 
increasing prominence. Areas of application include economic growth (Brock and 
Durlauf (2001), Brock, Durlauf and West (2003), Doppelhoffer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin 
(2000) and Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001)), finance (Avramov (2002)), and forecasting 
(Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Wright (2003a,b))  Some initial work on 
applications to monetary policy evaluation appears in Brock, Durlauf and West (2003). 
While model averaging is a powerful tool in addressing model uncertainty, one 
can imagine contexts in which a policymaker will want more information than simply a 
summary statistic of the effects of a policy on outcomes where model dependence has 
been integrated out. For example, a policymaker may be interested in policies whose 
effects are relatively insensitive to which model is the correct one. Alternatively, a 
policymaker may wish to engage in model selection, and would like to know how this 
selection affects the likely efficacy of the policy.  One reason for this is that a 
policymaker may not wish to adjust policies in response to the updating of model 
probabilities. For this reason, we believe that proper reporting of the effects of model 
uncertainty should also include descriptions of how model choice affects the form of a 
policy rule and the payoffs associated with that rule. This dependence leads us to 
calculate statistics that measure the degree of outcome dispersion, which characterizes 
how the losses associated with a model-specific optimal policy rule depends on the 
model, and action dispersion, which measures how the optimal policy differs across 
alternative models in a model space.   
Our work is most closely related to Levin and Williams (2003). This analysis 
compares policy rules under theoretically distinct models; models are averaged by 
assigning equal weights to each model; this approach differs from Bayesian averaging as 
their weights do not represent posterior model probabilities. Nevertheless, this paper is 
important as it is the first extensive analysis of model averaging methods as applied to 
monetary policy.  A significant virtue of Levin and Williams over our paper is that they 
are able to work with a much richer theory set than we do, in particular they include a 
model-consistent forward-looking model in their model space. On the other hand, they do 
not address the implications of model uncertainty that arise because of dynamics.  Our   4
work is complementary to Cogley and Sargent (2004) who consider US monetary policy 
but with a positive rather than a normative focus. Cogley and Sargent consider 
adjustments to US monetary policy generated by changes in the weights assigned by the 
Federal Reserve to different models of inflation, showing that such model uncertainty 
helps explain the dynamics of inflation after 1970.   
Our major concern in the empirical work in this paper is with the appropriate way 
to present the results of policy evaluation exercises.  One obvious way to think about this 
problem is simply to compute expected losses under different policies where the 
expectation calculations account for model uncertainty. This approach requires the 
specification of prior probabilities on the space of possible models. Alternatively, one can 
apply a minimax criterion even though the model space we study is non-local.  As argued 
in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003), one may interpret Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds 
analysis as doing this.  However, our purpose is not to defend a particular way in which 
decisions respond to model uncertainty but rather to describe ways to report predictions 
concerning policy effects in a way that communicates how model uncertainty affects 
these predictions. We will therefore emphasize some informal quantitative and visual 
tools to communicate how model uncertainty enters policy evaluation.  
We apply our general analysis to some standard questions on monetary 
economics. In our empirical analysis, we consider two classes of standard New 
Keynesian models.  Models in each class include three equations: a dynamic IS curve 
relating output to a real interest rate; a dynamic Phillips curve relating inflation to output 
and expected inflation; and a monetary policy (Taylor) rule relating the interest rate to 
output, inflation and a lagged interest rate.  The two classes differ in their treatment of 
expectations.  Our backwards class, which builds on Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), 
treats expected inflation as a distributed lag on past inflation.  Our hybrid class, which 
builds on Rudebusch (2002), uses survey data on expected inflation in estimation but 
assumes model-consistent expectations in evaluation of alternative monetary policies.   
Within a given class, models vary only in terms of the number of lags included on the 
right hand sides of the IS and Phillips curves.  We consider the effects of alternative 
monetary policy rules using a loss function based on a weighted average of variances of   5
output, inflation and interest rates; we refer to the losses incurred under this specification 
as risk. Our analysis of the model space reveals that the hybrid models possess a posterior 
probability that is an order of magnitude higher than that of the backwards looking 
models.  So while we do average within classes, we do not average across the model 
classes, and rather report results for each class separately.  We do so because our model 
classes are defined around models that themselves were data mined for distinct model 
spaces.  We regard the question of how to construct model spaces around data mined 
models to be an important outstanding research question. 
We conduct three different empirical analyses. First, we consider the behavior of 
the losses associated with the classic Taylor (1993) rule when model uncertainty is 
present. Our findings suggest that risk estimates for the Taylor rule are quite robust in the 
sense that our risk estimates show relatively little variation across models.  Second, we 
compare the performance of the Taylor rule with the performance of an interest rate rule 
that sets current rates as a function of the lagged rate, current inflation, and current 
output.  We choose the parameters of the rule such that the parameters are optimal for the 
model with the maximum posterior probability in each of our classes. We find that for the 
backwards models, the optimized rule systematically dominates the Taylor rule, except 
for a small (in posterior probability sense) set of models where the optimized rule induces 
instability in the system.  For the hybrid class, the optimized rule uniformly dominates 
the Taylor rule.  Our final exercise considers how optimal three-variable interest rate 
rules vary across models. In this exercise, we compute optimal rules and associated risks 
for each model in the two model classes.  Our analysis of outcome and action dispersion 
is largely visual as it consists of the presentation of dispersion figures. As such, it is 
somewhat hard to identify simple messages from the exercise. One conclusion we do 
draw is that there appears to be some systematic relationship between the coefficients in 
the model-specific optimal rules and model complexity. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II of this paper describes our basic 
framework. Section III contains our various empirical exercises.  Section IV provides 
some interpretation of the findings in the context of a general dynamic linear model.  
Section V provides conclusions.  
 
II. Incorporating model uncertainty into statistical analyses  
 
Our basic argument concerning the analysis of policy in the presence of model 
uncertainty is that such uncertainty should be explicitly incorporated in the calculation of 
the effects of a policy.  In other words, we argue that from a decision-theoretic 
perspective, model uncertainty is not a property that should, via model selection 
exercises, be resolved prior to the evaluation of a policy rule, but rather is a component of 
that evaluation. To see why this is so, we follow the discussion in Brock, Durlauf, and 
West (2003); other analyses that advocate an explicit decision-theoretic approach to the 
analysis of data in economics include Chamberlain (2001) and Sims (2002).  This 
analysis is a straightforward application of standard statistical decision theory arguments, 
cf. Berger (1987).  
 
i. general framework 
 
Suppose that a policymaker wishes to evaluate the effect of a policy rule p on an 
outcome θ .  We assume that the policymaker’s assessment of the outcome depends only 
on the outcome so that one can separate the preferences of the policymaker from the 
probability measure characterizing θ  given the policy.  In assessing policies, the question 
of model uncertainty arises in the context of specifying the information set on which the 
assessment is conditioned. Typically, one begins with a specification of the data 
generating process, i.e.  
 
  ( ) ,, m mp θ βη =  (1) 
 
where m denotes a model, p is a policy,  m β  is a vector of parameters that indexes the 
model and η  is a set of  unobservable shocks that affect θ .  It may be assumed, without 
loss of generality, that when evaluating policies, the data generating process and 
  6probability measure for the innovation,  η µ  are known even though the realizations of the 
shocks are not, so that policies are evaluated based on the conditional probability measure 
  
  ( ) ,,m pm µ θβ  (2) 
 
This formulation indicates the first level at which the effects of policies are uncertain. 
Even if the data generating process and associated parameters are known, there is 
uncertainty due to the unobservability of η .  
Eq. (2) implies that a policymaker possesses a great deal of information about the 
data generating process. Such information is typically not available to the researcher, and 
its absence must be accounted for to provide appropriate statements about the effects of a 
policy.  The relaxation of the information implicitly assumed in (2) may be done in two 
steps. First, assuming that the model is known, there is typically uncertainty about the 
values of the model parameters  m β .  Operationally, this means that one computes  
 
  ( ) ,, p md µθ  (3) 
 
The difference between (2) and (3) is that in (3) one is implicitly using the available data 
 to construct estimates of the model parameters. For macroeconomic problems, this is 
generally regarded as a second-order; exceptions to this include Giannoni (2001) and 
Onatski and Williams (2003). While we do not address parameter uncertainty in our 
empirical examples, we note that the lack of importance of parameter uncertainty has by 
no means been established as an empirical matter and is in fact contradicted by 
Gianonni’s and Onatski and Williams’s findings; this is a topic that warrants further 
research. 
d
For our purposes, the key issue of interest is how to move beyond (3) to account 
for uncertainty in the specification of the data generating process, which we will refer to 
as model uncertainty.  This level of uncertainty captures that of strong knowledge 
concerning economic theories, functional form specification (including threshold effects, 
switching regimes, etc.) and heterogeneity in the data generating processes for individual 
  7observations. Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) provide a typology of forms of model 
uncertainty along these lines.  One goal of a policy evaluation may be the calculation of  
 
  ( ) ,. p d µθ  (4) 
 
In other words, one way a policymaker can deal with model uncertainty is to treat it as 
another type of unobservable similar to η  and  m β  and evaluate policies in a way that 
accounts for this. 
As recognized originally in Leamer (1978) and developed in subsequent work 
such as Draper (1995), this idea may be operationalized using standard probability 
arguments to eliminate the conditioning on m that is present in (3).  To do this, suppose 
that an analyst is working with a space M of possible data generating processes.  We will 
implicitly assume that the true model is an element of this space when discussing how we 
interpret empirical findings; none of the empirical findings we present are themselves 
dependent on that assumption.
3 Without loss of generality, we take the space to be 
countable.  
  Standard application of conditional probability arguments implies that the 
( , ) p d µθ  may be characterized as follows: 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ,, ,
m
p dp m d µθ µθ µ = m d ∑  (5) 
 
In this expression,  ( md µ )  is known as the posterior probability of model m given data 
d.  From the perspective of (5), model uncertainty is treated in a fashion that is symmetric 
to any other source of uncertainty in θ .   
Eq. (5) reveals how the incorporation of model uncertainty into policy analysis 
requires the calculation of a class of objects, posterior model probabilities, which simply 
do not appear when one evaluates policies after engaging in model selection. To 
  8understand what these probabilities mean, by Bayes’ rule, these probabilities are the 
product of two terms, i.e.  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) md dm m µµ µ ∝  (6) 
 
where  ( dm µ )  is the likelihood of the data given model m and   is a prior 
probability assigned to model m. This derivation illustrates two features concerning the 
role of model uncertainty in policy evaluation.   
() m µ
First, if one starts with a space of possible models which is constructed without 
knowledge of which models fit particularly well, then model averaging can ameliorate 
problems associated with data mining.  Eq. (5) indicates how probability calculations can 
employ all models in the model space, incorporating the relatively greater likelihood of 
some models versus others via the  ( ) dm µ  terms.  Hence, the standard problem of data 
mining, drawing inferences about a model without accounting for its selection, does not 
arise. This observation requires two caveats. First, it is important in constructing the 
( dm µ )
                                                                                                                                                
 terms to avoid overweighting more complex models simply because of their 
superior goodness of fit. As we shall see below, model complexity penalties (in our case, 
based on the BIC) are needed when calculating posterior model probabilities. Second, in 
some cases it may not be possible or practical to analyze the set of all possible models. 
Hence, data mining problems may occur because of limits in the analysis that exist in the 
model space in the way we have described.  
Second, the issue of model selection does not arise when one takes the averaging 
perspective.  Heuristically, one may understand model selection exercises as choosing a 
model based on its relative goodness of fit (adjusted for model complexity). In the 
context of our approach, model selection of this type is equivalent to placing a posterior 
probability of 1 on the model with the highest posterior probability. Thought of this way, 
it is easy to see why model selection can lead to very misleading assessments of policy 
 
  9
3Bernardo and Smith (1994) discuss the interpretation of model spaces under alternative 
assumptions as to whether the true model is in the space.  efficacy.  For example, model uncertainty calculations avoid situations where one model 
may far outstrip others by a selection criterion, yet the posterior model probability is 
small relative to the space as a whole.   
Third, any analysis of model uncertainty will be dependent on a researcher’s prior 
beliefs about the relative plausibility of different models, as quantified through the prior 
probabilities  .   Very little work has been done on the question of appropriately 
formulating priors over model spaces.  Most papers assign a uniform prior across the 
model space.  One alternative, suggested by Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin 
(2000) penalizes complex models by assigning relatively lower prior weights to them.  
Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) discuss ways to use economic information to structure 
priors that reflect theoretical, specification, and parameter heterogeneity differences 
between models.  However, this is a question that needs much more research.  
() m µ
  Calculations of this type make clear how model uncertainty affects policy 
evaluation. Suppose that a policy maker evaluates policies according to a risk function
4 
() R θ  and that the policymaker evaluates a policy rule based on the expected loss it 
generates.  Standard policy analyses calculate 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) ,, ,,d E R pmd R pmd θ θµθ θ
Θ =∫  (7) 
 
whereas an analysis that allows for model uncertainty should calculate  
 
  () () ( ) ( ) , ER p d R p d , d θ θµθ θ
Θ =∫  (8) 
 
In contexts such as stabilization policy, one usually is interested in the first two moments 
of  ( , ) p d µθ .  These moments were originally computed by Leamer (1978) and are 
discussed in great detail in Draper (1995):  
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4We refer to a risk function rather than a loss function in order to use language that is 
standard in the monetary policy literature.  
  () ( ) ( ) ,
m
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ii. model uncertainty and ambiguity aversion 
 
Our discussion has so far treated model uncertainty in a way that is equivalent to 
innovation uncertainty (i.e. lack of knowledge of η ) and parameter uncertainty.  There 
are reasons to believe that one may not want to assume this equivalence.  One of these 
reasons derives from the body of experimental work that is associated with the Ellsberg 
paradox. Consider two scenarios: in scenario A, a bet may placed on the color of a ball 
drawn from an urn when the distribution of colors is known to be 50/50 between black 
and red whereas in scenario B a bet may be placed on the color of a ball drawn from an 
urn where the distribution between black and red is not known, but where the subject can 
choose the color. The Ellsberg paradox refers to the observation that in various 
experiments, subjects place a higher value on the former bet; the paradox occurs since by 
symmetry, the fact that one can choose which color ball to bet on makes it impossible to 
differentiate the second bet from the first bet in an expected value sense.  Such 
observations have led to a recent literature on ambiguity aversion, exemplified by Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994).  Following Epstein and Wang 
(1994), ambiguity aversion can be introduced by considering the modified expected loss 
function 
 
  ()() ()() ( ) (1 ) d sup , d mM el d e l m d θ µθ θ θµθ θ ∈ ΘΘ −+ ∫∫  (11) 
  11 
This loss function places an additional weight on the least favorable model in the model 
space beyond that which is done in a standard expected loss calculation.
5 This function 
nests the expected loss approach ( 0 e = ) and the minimax approach ( ) that is 




iii. model uncertainty and stabilization policy 
 
  We now specialize these formulas for the analysis of stabilization policies.  To do 
this, we consider the scalar case where the policymaker is interested in stabilizing output 
relative to trend, . We assume that a policymaker evaluates rules according to their 




  ( ) , var y p d ∞  (12) 
 
This loss function is timeless in the sense of Woodford (2003) and thus avoids problems 
of time inconsistency.  We assume that the policy cannot affect the long-run mean of the 
series, so that 
 
  ( ) ,0   E yp d p ∞ = ∀  (13) 
 
This is a substantive economic assumption and one that is frequently built into 
macroeconomics models, for example to reflect a long run Phillips curve.  Under this 
assumption  
 
  ()( ) ( ) ,
mM
var y p d m d var y p m d µ ∞
∈
= , , ∞ ∑  (14) 
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5A remarkable early formulation of this type appears in Hurwicz (1951).  
Relative to (10), the second term on the right hand side (RHS) disappears when (13) 
holds.   
In the context of analyzing stabilization policies, one can further observe that the 
overall variance associated with a given policy,  ( ) , Var y p d ∞ , may be contrasted with 
two other calculations which are suggested by our discussion:  
 
( ,,m Var y p m ) β ∞  = overall within-model variance due to unobserved innovations; this 
level of variance is irreducible in the sense that it is present even if a model and 
associated parameters are known 
 
( ,, Var y p m d ∞ )  = overall within-model variance due to parameter uncertainty given a 
model 
 
As one moves from uncertainty due to innovations and parameters to uncertainty that also 
reflects lack of knowledge of the true model, one moves from conventional model 
exercises to the approach we advocate.  Put differently, if one engages in model selection, 
one typically computes  () ,,m Var y p m β ∞  or  ( ) ,, Var y p m d ∞ whereas we would argue 
the correct object for study in policy analysis is  ( ) , Var y p d ∞ . 
  Finally, we consider how to evaluate uncertainty about the variance we have 
described; we focus specifically on the “variance of the variance” associated with a given 
policy.  While a mean/variance loss function is not affected by this calculation, other 
preferences structures are.  To perform these second order variance calculations, notice 
that by (13),  () ( )
2 , Var y p d E y p d ∞∞ = ,   W e  c a n  t h u s  u s e  f o r m ulas (9) and (10) to 
calculate  (
2 , Var y p d ∞ ) .  Since  ( )
2 , Ey p d ∞  is, unlike  ( ) , Ey p d ∞ , dependent on  p , one 
has 
 
  13 
( )







var y p d










The second term on the RHS of (15) captures the distinct role that model uncertainty 
plays in assessing the payoff associated with a policy.  The first term represents the 
uncertainty contribution given the models. This decomposition into a within-model and 
across-model uncertainty corresponds to the analysis in Gustafson and Clarke (2004).  
Notice that the only reason why  ( ) ( )
2 ,, , Ey p dm Ey p d ∞ −
2
∞  is nonzero is variability 
across models.  
  These calculations lead to a hierarchical view of policy assessment. As we have 
claimed above, conventional policy evaluation exercises calculate either 
() ,,m Var y p m β ∞  or  ( ,, Var y p m d ∞ )  where the model m is chosen by some criterion 
that trades goodness of fit against model complexity.  Such calculations are of course 
important.  What we argue is that in addition to such calculations, one should also 
compute  ( , Var y p d ∞ ) , which describes the consequences of the same policy without the 
assumption that the model selection exercise has identified the correct model.  The 
discrepancy between these two measures will provide a metric for the economic 
significance of model uncertainty.  Notice that there is no necessary ordering between 
() ,,,m Var y p d m β ∞ ,  () ,, Var y p d m ∞  and  ( ) , Var y p d ∞  as model uncertainty may 
lower the variance associated with a policy if the policy works better for those parameters 
that have not been assumed or for a different model.  It is possible for the introduction of 
model uncertainty to reverse the relative rankings of models.  
 
iv. implementation issues 
 
a. priors and the reporting of results 
  
  14  15
                                                
  The calculations we have described require the specification of prior probabilities 
for the elements of the model space M.  The construction of priors continues to be a 
knotty problem in Bayesian statistics.  One difficulty in the construction of priors derives 
from the difficulties inherent in translating vague prior beliefs possessed by a researcher 
into probabilities.  This difficulty has led to a large literature on Bayesian probability 
elicitation, an approach that has not been pursued in the model uncertainty context.  Most 
studies of model uncertainty and model averaging assume that all elements in M possess 
equal prior probabilities, a standard assumption when one wants to employ a 
noninformative prior, i.e one that expresses ignorance.
6  Other authors have modified the 
equal probability assumption either by assuming the model probabilities are themselves 
random, which in essence makes the prior a mixture distribution (Brown, Vannucci, and 
Fearn (1998)) or by assigning higher prior probabilities to simpler models (Doppelhofer, 
Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000)).  None of these approaches use social science reasoning 
to construct priors. Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) argue that priors should possess a 
hierarchical structure that reflects the differences between theory uncertainty and 
specification uncertainty conditional on a theory. It is unclear that these different 
approaches are of major importance operationally. 
  An alternative perspective is that the goal of a policy evaluation analysis is to 
communicate to a policymaker the effects of a policy under alternative assumptions 
rather than to perform expected loss calculations per se. As we have argued, assumptions 
about the theoretical basis and specification of the model of the phenomenon of interest 
are of primary importance in this respect.  To the extent this is true, and recognizing the 
possibility that ambiguity aversion means that a policymaker may react to model 
uncertainty differently from parameter uncertainty, for example, then the averaging 
approach may not be sufficiently informative.  A policymaker may want to know if there 
are outlier models in the sense that a policy works particularly poorly when they are 
correct. Notice that this is not the same thing as asking whether certain models are 
outliers in terms of certain parameter values, overall goodness of fit, etc.  For this reason, 
 
6There are many conceptual problems in defining what it means for a prior to be 
uninformative; these issues are not germane to our discussion. we argue that a significant part of a policy evaluation exercise is the presentation of 
different perspectives on how model uncertainty affects one’s conclusions. We are 
therefore concerned to identify useful statistics and visual representations of policy 
effects as they vary across models. 
 
b. Bayesian versus frequentist 
 
  Our discussion has been explicitly Bayesian in that our analysis has focused on 
the construction of probability measures on the unknowns θ  given observed data and 
prior information, i.e.  ( d µθ ) .  These calculations, in turn, employed Bayesian within-
model posterior probabilities  ( ) , dm µθ .  That being said, the logic of our model 
averaging arguments really only depend on the use of posterior model probabilities 
( md µ ) .  If one can identify an interpretable way of constructing these model 
probabilities, then one can integrate these with frequentist objects in order to address 
model uncertainty without fully committing to Bayesian methods.  For example, if one is 
interested in constructing an estimate  ˆ θ  which is not model-dependent, this can be done 
via 
 





= ∑  (16) 
 
 
Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000), who perform such calculations in the 
context of OLS regression parameters when there is uncertainty about the choice of 
controls, call this approach Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE); Brock, 
Durlauf, and West (2003) refer the general approach of averaging frequentist objects 
using model weights as a pseudo-frequentist procedure. What is important, of course, is 
not the terminology, but the idea that incorporation of model uncertainty into a data 
exercise can provide interpretable results.  This is extremely important since frequentist 
  16  17
methods dominate policy evaluation analysis.  We employ this pseudo-frequentist 
approach in the empirical section of this paper. 
 
vi. beyond model averaging: outcome dispersion and action dispersion 
 
As suggested in the Introduction, in evaluating the role of model uncertainty in 
policy assessment, we believe it is useful to think about two concepts: outcome 
dispersion and action dispersion.  Outcome dispersion captures the variation in loss that 
occurs when one considers different models.  When working with a fixed policy, the 
variation of losses under the policy traces out the range of the loss function, where the 
latter is interpreted as a function of the policy.  Averaging calculations can thus be treated 
as data reductions of the support of the loss function; a data reduction in which a 
(posterior probability) weighted sum of the range is computed.  
When a policy is allowed to depend on a model, one can define an analogous 
notion of action dispersion.  Each model induces a distinct policy, so the model space 
traces out a range of policies.  For example, one can compute how the parameters of a 
simple monetary policy rule, say one that maps last period’s Federal Funds rate, the 
current inflation level and the current output level into this period’s Federal Funds rate, 
varies across models.  Why might such information be of use to a policymaker?  One 
reason is that calculations of action dispersion can reveal how sensitive a policy rule is to 
model choice. To the extent that a policymaker decides to condition policies on a model, 
action dispersion can reveal the extent to which this matters. In turn, one can argue that a 
desideratum of a policy rule is that its formulation is relatively insensitive to certain 
details of the economic environment in which it is applied.  Giannoni and Woodford 
(2002) make this idea precise in a theoretical context; our calculations of action 
dispersion provide an empirical representation to their ideas.   
 
 
III. Model uncertainty and assessment of simple monetary policy rules 
 In this section, we provide an illustration of the methodological discussion using a 
simple empirical example; the example extends work in Brock, Durlauf, and West 




We suppose that a monetary policymaker is contemplating the choice of 
parameters in a simple monetary policy rule.  This class of rule is studied in many papers, 
a thorough example is Levin, Wieland and Williams (1998). Denoting the output gap as 
, inflation as  t y t π  and the nominal interest rate on 1-period government bonds as  , we 
assume that the policymaker employs a nominal interest rate rule 
t i
 
  1 tt y t i ig g yg i π t π − = ++ (17) 
 
Following standard assumptions and terminology in the monetary rules literature, losses 
are calculated via a risk function R, defined as  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) yi R var var y var i πλ λ ∞ ∞ =+ +∞ ∆  (18) 
 
In our risk calculations, we will always assume  1.0 y λ =  and  0.1 i λ = .   This choice of 
weights is arbitrary but is in the range assumed by earlier literature using similar loss 
functions, e.g. Levin and Williams (2003). 
Our alternative models represent examples of the New Keynesian model 
exposited in Woodford (2003).  The particular representations we employ are taken from 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2002). These models may be 
understood as two equation systems. The first component of the system is an IS curve 
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= ∑  and   is an unobservable disturbance. The second 
component is a Phillips curve that relates inflation to expected inflation, lagged inflation, 
lagged output and an unobservable disturbance 
, IS t u
, PCt u . The weights on inflation are 
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In eq. (20) and throughout, we suppress inessential constants for expositional simplicity; 
these were included in all our empirical work. 
Model uncertainty exists at two levels in our framework.  The first level 
corresponds to our notion of theory uncertainty as it relates to the way in which 
expectations are formed by agents.  First, backwards looking and hybrid models are 
differentiated by treatment of  1 tt E 3 π − + . For backwards looking models, 
 
  ( ) 1 3 123 .25 tt t t t t E ππ π π π −+ − − − − =+ + + 4  (21) 
 
whereas for hybrid models.  
 
  13survey data on 1-year ahead inflation tt E π −+ =  (22) 
 
The backwards looking modeling follows Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) whereas the 
hybrid modeling follows Rudebusch (2002). As well, the backwards model sets the 
coefficient on expected inflation in the Phillips curve to 0 (i.e.  0 0 β = ).  We refer to the 
backwards and hybrid cases as our two classes of models. 
  19  Second, there is specification uncertainty that exists once one has conditioned a 
given theory.  This uncertainty is modeled with respect to the terms in brackets in 
equations (19) and (20).  Different lag structures correspond to alternative ways of 
capturing output and inflation dynamics; these dynamics are not constrained by economic 
theory but rather are included in order to capture serial correlation in the model errors.  In 
each class of models, we estimate 4 different IS curves, with one, two, three and four lags 
of output on the RHS. We estimate 16 different Phillips curves, with one to four lags of 
output and one to four lags of inflation in the RHS.  Thus within each class of models 
there are 64  specifications; each specification corresponds to a specific set of lag 
structures for the IS/PC system. 
4 16 =×
  Under the assumption that policy is deterministic, we use estimated values for the 
parameters of the IS and Phillips curves to solve the model and compute values of the 
loss function under alternative policy parameters.  Our analysis assumes that the IS and 
Phillips curves are structurally stable over the 1970-2002 sample. We are aware of 
evidence to the contrary, but leave this complication to future work.  We also do not 
allow for one class of models to represent a better approximation of the underlying data 
generating process in some periods but not others.
7  Our simplifications are made to 
facilitate the exposition of how one might incorporate model uncertainty in evaluating the 
losses associated with alternative policies.   For each model and a given set of policy 
preference parameters  y λ  and  π λ , we use a grid search procedure to solve for the values 
of  gπ ,  , and   that minimize the loss function  (18).   y g i g
  We calculate losses as follows. For a given model m, let  ˆ
m R  denote model risk, 
when uncertainty associated with estimated parameters is ignored.  Let  ˆ
m L  denote the 
BIC-adjusted likelihood for the model.  For a given set of models, the expected risk 
ˆ R associated with model uncertainty is 
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7See Brock and Hommes (1997) for a theoretical discussion of modeling epoch-
dependent expectations formation in which individual agents make correlated investment 
decisions in information that collectively vary at different points in time and Pesaran, 
Pettenuzzo, and Timmermann (2004) for methods to identify different epochs.   ( ) ˆˆ
m
mM
R Rm d µ
∈
= ∑  (23) 
  
We assume that all models within a model class have equal prior probability. 
While we would prefer to assign priors in ways that are suggested by economic 
reasoning, we have yet to develop a natural way to do so in this context.  We also see no 
reason why more complicated models warrant smaller (or larger) priors than simpler 





















We consider a number of ways to communicate the importance of model 
uncertainty in policy choice. In addition to various averaging calculations, we quantify 
our notions of outcome and action dispersion. Dispersion is measured in several ways, 
including support width (absolute value of the difference between the maximum and 
minimum values of the object of interest as it varies across models), standard deviation 
and interquartile range of risk across models.  In reporting outcome dispersion, we 
acknowledge that one would like to consider outcome dispersion with respect to a range 
of policy preference structures but do not do so here.  Finally, note that action dispersion 


















%  and  .  We employ the 
normalizations 
i g
gπ %  and   in order to evaluate variation in the long-run effects of income 
and inflation on interest rates respectively.  
y g %
As part of our goal is to report visual descriptions of the properties of the model 
space, we will associate each model with a number. This relationship is described in 
Appendix 1.  
    
ii. data 
  21 
  All estimation is done using quarterly data from 1970:2 to 2002:4, with data from 
1969:2 to 1970:1 used to provide lags.  Apart from survey data, this is the same data 
studied in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003).  Inflation  t π  is measured as the annualized 
change in the GDP deflator.  The output gap   is computed as the difference between 
real GDP and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of potential GDP.  The interest 
rate   is the quarterly average Federal Funds rate.  We constructed the survey 
expectations measure of 
t y
t i
1 tt E 3 π −+  from the median price expectations of the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters.  Let 
e
tt P  denote the period t survey expectation of the GDP 
deflator (GNP deflator prior to 1992) in the current quarter and  4
e
tt P+ denote the 
expectation of the deflator four quarters (one year) from t.  We set   
( 13 31 11 100 log /
ee
tt tt tt EP π −+ +− −− =× ) P .  For two quarters (1970:3 and 1974:3),  4
e
tt P+  was 
missing; we substituted an extrapolation of the three-quarter-ahead expectation  3
e
tt P+ . 
 
iii. basic properties of the model space 
 
We first consider some properties of the model space.  Table 1 presents regression 
results for the backward and hybrid specifications with the highest posterior probability.  
These are the models that would be selected if one were using the BIC criterion to choose 
one model within each class.  The results are consistent with those for the backward 
specification of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and the hybrid specification of 
Rudebusch (2002).  In the IS curve, the BIC-adjusted likelihood chooses three lags of 
output in the backwards specification, two lags in the hybrid specification.  The sum of 
regression coefficients and the interest rate elasticity are similar in both specifications.  In 
the Phillips curve, both specifications choose one lag of output.  The backward 
specification uses three lags of inflation, while the hybrid combines the survey 
expectation with a single lag.  (Recall that by construction, the sum of the lags (and lead, 
  22for the hybrid specification) on inflation is 1.)  The hybrid specification puts substantial 
weight on the survey expectation, with  .  0 ˆ 0.32 β =
The maximum posterior probability hybrid model involves two fewer parameters 
than does this backwards model.  For this reason, as well as some other quantitatively 
less important ones, the BIC-adjusted bivariate likelihood for the hybrid model is two 
orders of magnitude higher than that of the backward looking model (not reported in the 
table).   We do not interpret the relative BIC-adjusted likelihoods as arguing for great 
posterior weight on hybrid versus backwards models.  We came to this specification only 
after experimenting with various model consistent measures of expectations (not 
reported), and by choosing the very best fitting specification in Rudebusch (2002).   For 
example, we do not include terms on forward looking output in the IS equation, because 
Rudebusch (2002) found these to not be significant.   We return to this point below when 
we combine backward and hybrid models. 
How do model probabilities differ across the model space? Table 2 presents 
summary statistics on the distribution of the posterior model probabilities across the 64 
models in each of the two classes. To do this, we focus on the relative likelihoods of each 

















where the sum in the denominator runs over the 64 models in a given class (backward or 




= ∑ . In each class, the relative likelihood 
is clustered around a handful of models.  Row (6) in Table 2 indicates that only 8 
(backward) or 13 (hybrid) models have likelihood as much as 1/20 of the likelihood of 
the model with the highest posterior. We will designate this group of models as 
possessing “high” likelihoods or “high” posteriors in our subsequent discussion.  The 
factor of 1/20 is made to facilitate highlighting those models most consistent with the 
data and follows ideas that have appeared elsewhere in the model averaging literature, 
  23e.g. Gustafson and Clarke (2004); minor changes in the definition of what is meant by a 
posterior probability would not change any qualitative features of our discussion.  Row 8 
of Table 2 indicates that in each class of models the 16 models with highest posterior 
probability dominate the relative likelihood. 
 
iv. the original Taylor rule revisited 
 
  Our first analysis using the model space considers the effects of model uncertainty 




t y  1.5 0.5 tt i π = +  (26) 
 
This rule may be evaluated with respect to outcome and action dispersion. Relative to our 
earlier discussion, action dispersion is by definition 0 since the rule is constant across 
specifications. Outcome dispersion is described in Table 3, which characterizes the way 
in which the risk associated with the original Taylor rule varies across the model space.  
Overall, for the class of backwards looking models, the risk values appear to be relatively 
stable. When one concentrates on relatively likely backwards models, the risk estimates 
are all in the range of 19.1 to 23.2; the same exercise for hybrid models yields the 
somewhat broader range of approximately 15.2 to 31.9.  There do exist outlier models 
with very different risk values: the support for Taylor rule risk for the backwards models 
is appropriately 17.5 to 51.6 and the support for the hybrid models is 12.5 to 44.7.  Row 8 
of the Table provides the model averaging calculations, in which the model specific risk 
of the Taylor rule is averaged using posterior model probabilities according to (24).  It is 
interesting to compare our model averaged risk estimates, 22.0 for the backwards class 
and 23.6 for the hybrid class, with the respective risks that occur for the maximum 
posterior probability models in each class, 23.2 and 24.1 respectively.  The averaged 
numbers are lower, indicating that the Taylor rule works better for at least some models 
that would be ignored if one simply focused on the maximum posterior models.  
                                                 
8We report the demeaned version of the rule but used constants in the empirical work.    This exercise suggests that the Taylor rule generally has good outcome robustness 
properties.  
 
v. comparing simple rules 
 
  As a second exercise, we consider the relative performance of the original Taylor 
rule against an optimized three-variable rule of the form (17). To do this, we calculate 
values of  gπ ,   and   which minimize the risk function (18) using the weights 
described below the equation for the backward model with the highest posterior 
probability and hybrid model with the highest posterior probability.  As described in the 
next section, we found these parameters by a grid search.  The results of the grid search 
are: 
y g i g
 
backwards: 3.2, 2.1, 0.2;  hybrid: 3.2, 4.7, 0.55 yi yi ggg ggg ππ == = === %% %%  (27) 
 
Both policies are more aggressive than the original (1993) Taylor rule.   
Our objective is to compare the performance of these rules with the Taylor rule.  
The optimized rules will of course outperform the Taylor rule when the posterior model 
with the highest probability in a model space is the true one; what we wish to ascertain is 
how this comparison is affected when one accounts for the presence of model 
uncertainty. In order to do these comparisons, we perform two sets of exercises. First, we 
compare the Taylor rule to the model-specific three-variable rule where the rule is 
computed for the same class on which the comparison is done.  These comparisons mean 
that the policymaker is confident that his given choice of model class is the correct one, 
and is concerned only with misspecification within that class.  Second, we do the same 
comparisons when the policymaker has chosen the wrong class. This means we compare 
the Taylor and three-variable rule optimized for the higher posterior backwards model on 
the class of hybrid models and vice versa. This exercise will be of interest to a 
policymaker who has tentatively chosen a model class but wishes to understand the costs 
if the other class in fact better captures salient features of the economy.  
  25Figure 1 presents a graph of the relative risks of the optimized 3-variable and 
Taylor rules across the model space for both our exercises. Models are reported using the 
numbering described in Appendix 1. All relative risks are the ratios of the risk using the 
optimized rule to the risk using the Taylor (1993) rule, eq. (26).  We depict those cases 
where the hybrid rule produced instability, which happened to occur for some backwards 
but no hybrid models, with a solid line truncated at 1.8; this is done for readability.    
  Figure 1 yields several interesting findings.  We first focus on the two graphs in 
the first row, in which the policymaker is confident a given class of models is the correct 
one.  As the Figure indicates, for the hybrid models, the optimized rule uniformly 
dominates the Taylor rule across the model space.  Second, for the backwards models, the 
relative risk of the optimized 3-variable rule is either 40% smaller than the Taylor rule or 
greater than 1. An examination of the specific models for which the Taylor rule 
outperforms the optimized rule explains why this is happening. For this subset of models, 
the optimized rule produces instability in at least one of the state variables, thereby 
producing infinite risk. The possibility that a rule that is optimal for one model produces 
instability in another is, as a theoretical matter, not surprising, and has been recognized 
by other authors, cf. Levin and Williams (2003, pg. 953). How serious a problem is this? 
The posterior probability for the set of models for which the optimized rule produces 
instability is .003.
9  Hence, the probability of instability appears to be quite small.   
Because of the loss function that is assumed, if any of these models receives a positive 
weight in the expected loss calculation, the case that the Taylor rule will be preferred.  
This is an example where we believe the visual presentation of evidence is of particular 
value to a policymaker since the assessment of large (in this case, infinite) risk with small 
probabilities is something that may be poorly captured by simply reporting model 
averaged risk numbers.  
  When the policymaker has chosen the wrong theory, one again finds that for the 
hybrid case, the model-specific optimized rule strictly dominates the Taylor rule.  This is 
interesting as it indicates that the failure to condition on lagged interest rates is a serious 
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deficiency of the Taylor for the hybrid case.  For backwards models, one once again finds 
that there are 4 models for which the optimal rule induces instability, these are of course 
different from those found when the optimized rule is conditioned on the correct theory; 
the total posterior probability of these rules is .002.
10  In addition, one finds that there are 
some models for which the Taylor rule outperforms the optimized rule even though the 
latter produces stability.   There are 8 models of this type with posterior probability .08.
11 
Interestingly, the models are generally those with longer lag lengths. 
We next consider model averaging exercises that can reduce the information 
contained in Figure 1 down to a set of simple statistics. Table 4 reports risk ratios for 
model averaged risks.  As noted above, the optimized rule produced instability for some 
backwards models, which would imply a value of infinity for the risk under the rule and 
would mean under an averaging calculation that the model averaged risk ratio and ratios 
of model averaged risk are both infinite. In order to produce nontrivial averaging 
calculations, for any model with infinite risk under the optimized rule we use risk values 
that produce a model-specific risk ratio of 5 and 20.  Some authors do propose assigning 
a finite risk to unstable models (e.g. Del Negro and Schorfeide (2004) who suggest the 
risk ratio 5 as a benchmark) while others assign infinite risk, (e.g. Levin and Williams 
(2003)). We also report (in column 5) the replacement values that will produce overall 
risk comparisons that render one indifferent between the Taylor and optimized rules; we 
remind the reader that this is only relevant for backwards models since the hybrid models 
are never unstable.   
Our model averaging exercises uniformly provide support for the optimized rule 
over the Taylor rule.  Interestingly, the optimized rule outperforms the Taylor rule even 
when the policymaker has erred in terms of choice of model class.  This illustrates the 
value of allowing an interest rate rule to depend on lagged interest rates. We would also 
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9Letting   denote the model specification with i income lags in the IS equation, j 
income and k inflation lags in the Phillips curve equation, the models in which instability 
occurs are (1,1,1), (2,1,1), (3,1,1) and (4,1,1).
10The models which are unstable in this exercise are (1,2,4), (2,1,1), (3,4,4), and (4,1,1). 
11The models where the Taylor rule outperforms the model-specific optimized rule are 
(4,1,3), (4,1,4), (4,2,3), (4,2,4), (4,3,3), (4,3,4), (4,4,3) and (4,4,4). note that one needs to assign model-specific risk ratios of about 65 for unstable models in 
order to conclude that the Taylor rule performed as well as the optimized rule.  
  Table 5 reports some summary statistics for our two exercises when the Taylor 
rule/optimized rule comparisons are restricted to models in which neither rule produces 
instability.  Similar results hold for the cases for rules optimized on the highest posterior 
model in the correct class of models and rules optimized on the wrong class. One 
important feature of the Table is its demonstration that the relative risk between the two 
rules is extremely stable across the model specifications.  As might have been expected 
given the findings in Table 4, this applies whether or not the rule is compared to the class 
whose maximum probability model was the basis of the rule.  This implies, given our 
analysis of outcome dispersion for the Taylor rule, that the theory and model-specific 
optimized rule, modulo models where instability is induced, also has good properties in 
terms of producing stable (across models) outcome dispersion. In addition, it appears that 
assuming the backwards theory is true when it is not has low costs to a policymaker, at 
least in terms of comparisons to the Taylor rule.  
  These findings lead to the conclusion that virtues of the Taylor rule relative to an 
optimized rule derive from its ability to avoid producing model instability and otherwise 
that the optimized rules are uniformly better. 
 
vi. outcome dispersion and action dispersion for optimal 3-variable rules 
 
In our third exercise, we explore the sensitivity of optimal 3-variable rules to 
model choice. The idea in this work is to understand how the specification and associated 
risk of an optimal rule varies about specifications. Unlike the previous exercises, we do 
not specify a single rule and look at its behavior across models; each model is associated 
with its specific optimal rule.  Table 6 presents information on the distribution of policy 
parameters and risk across models.  The parameters were found with a grid search, with 
step size of 0.1, except for   for hybrid models in which a secondary grid search with 
steps of 0.02 was used because initially there was almost no variation across models to 
the first decimal place.  Note that each column presents statistics across all 64 models.  
i g
  28To interpret the table, consider, for example, in the class of backward looking models, the 
minimum values presented in line (3).  The minimum value of  gπ %  of 2.9 need not have 
been found in the same specification that yielded the minimum value of  of 1.5, and 
neither of these specifications need have yielded the minimum value of risk R of 8.8.  
y g %
We first consider the median values presented in line (5) of panel A.  Consistent 
with previous literature such as Levin and Williams (2003), the hybrid model, which was 
solved treating expectations as model-consistent and thus forward looking, yields a 
lagged interest rate weight   that is higher than that for the backward model.  In other 
respects the parameters are also congruent with earlier research.  For example, in results 
not reported in the table we found that increasing 
i g
i λ  shifts the distribution (across 
models) of the associated optimal   upwards; increasing  i g y λ  also shifts the distribution 
of the associated optimal   upwards.  y g
We have argued that there is relatively little outcome dispersion within a given 
class of models, at least if we focus on models with high posteriors.  Table 7 illustrates 
that the same conclusion applies when we combine models from the two classes.  We 
combine using a simple arithmetic average, as in Levin and Williams (2003).  We do not 
weight by likelihood, as in much of the model averaging literature as well as our previous 
work (Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) because, as noted above, the hybrid model 
explicitly was derived after a larger than usual amount of data mining.   Panel A in Table 
7 asks about outcome dispersion if we simply hold fixed the parameters at the values that 
are optimal for the likeliest backwards model (columns (1)-(3) in panel A) or likeliest 
hybrid model (columns (4)-(6)).  Outcome dispersion is very small in columns (1)-(3); 
that is, a policy maker who is committed to using the parameters that are optimal for the 
likeliest backwards model is unlikely to be perturbed if he suddenly contemplates the 
possibility that hybrid model has a large element of truth as well.  Outcome dispersion is, 
however, perceptible in columns (4)-(6).   
The asymmetrical outcome results from the way we treated the two model classes.  
One could instead solve for parameters that are optimal given weights to each model.  
Results for this approach are given in panel B.  The weight on the backwards model is 
  29denoted  θ ; results for  0 θ =  and  1 θ =  repeat results in Table 5.C and are given for 
reference. As one would expect, the policy parameters move smoothly as θ  is varied.  
Unsurprisingly, action dispersion is small for gπ %  and moderate for  y g %  and  .   i g
  These tables may be complemented visually by graphs of the distributions of 
outcomes and actions across models.  This is done in the set of pictures contained in 
Figure  2.  As occurs in the reporting of objects such as impulse response functions from 
vector autoregressions, the visual reporting of outcome and action dispersion can suffer 
from a surfeit of information. We now turn to some suggestions on how these figures can 
be used by policymakers to inform decisions. 
  We first discuss action variance. Figure 2.A reports the different values of  gπ % , y g %  
and   that appear across the model-specific optimal rules in the backwards class.  The 
panels depict visually the information on dispersion summarized in Table 6:  there is a 
reasonable degree of dispersion across models with respect to 
i g
gπ %  (in the sense of a 
support width of 1.0)
12, large dispersion with respect to   (support width of 1.8) and 
moderate dispersion for   (support width of .4).  This implicitly means that the width of 
the support of the nonnormalized parameter 
y g %
i g
gπ  is about half that of the nonnormalized 
parameter  .  Hence, policymakers can conclude that  y g gπ  is relatively insensitive to 
model specification.  Within this variation,   is almost always greater than 0.  This helps 
explain why the Taylor rule was generally inferior to three variable rules even when the 
latter was optimized on the wrong model.  When one turns to the posterior weighted 
results, Figure 2.B, the main modification of these conclusions is that in some cases the 
supports of the parameters shrink when one focuses on those models whose posterior 
likelihoods are within 1/20 of the maximum posterior model.  When one concentrates on 
these relatively likely models, one finds much smaller variation in 
i g
gπ %  and   (measured 
by support width) than appears in Panel A.  Interestingly, there is relatively less 
y g %
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12We focus on support width in our discussion of dispersion, information on standard 
deviations and interquartile ranges are available in Table 6 and yield qualitatively similar 
conclusions.  diminution of the support width of   for the relatively likely models.  However, for the 
relatively likely models,   is always at least .1.  
i g
i g
Similar results obtain for the hybrid model. Figure 2.C indicates that for this class, 
there is a larger support for the gπ %  and   parameters than in the backwards case (with 
support widths of 1.0 and 2.2 respectively).  Compared with the backwards case, the 
variation in   is quite small, with a support width .1.  When one turns to the posterior 
weighted results in Figure 2.D, one finds little reduction in support width when attention 
is restricted to the relatively likely models.  
y g %
i g
What conclusions might a policymaker draw? One conclusion is that conditioning 
on lagged interest rates is a robust feature of optimal policies. A second conclusion is that 
if one conditions policy on the hybrid class, the interest rate parameter in a three-variable 
interest rule of the form (17) is insensitive to lag length specification whereas in other 
contexts, the optimal rule parameters can vary substantially across specifications.   
We next consider the dispersion of risk for the backwards models and the hybrids 
and compare.  An examination of dispersion in risk across all the models for backwards 
and we see clustering at around 10, 15, and 25 whereas for hybrids risk is essentially 
clumped around 6 or 7 (lower right panels of Figures 2.A and 2.C).   A policymaker who 
believed strongly in a backward looking world will want to proceed cautiously and look 
closely at what is generating this dispersion in risk.   Perhaps most of the models 
generating the wide dispersion have low posterior probability.  If one then examines the 
posterior weighted dispersion plot in the lower right hand panel of Figure 2,B it is evident 
that the risk clumping around 15 and 25 is generated by models with very low posterior 
probability.   The policymaker may now be quite relieved and simply concentrate on 
managing the cluster of models whose risk clumps around 10.   Further information is 
provided by focusing on relatively likely models.  This restriction would lead a 
policymaker to concentrate attention on managing in a world dominated by the four 
models that clearly stand out on the plot as having the bulk of the posterior probability.    
For the hybrid class, risk dispersion is very narrow in comparison to the 
backwards looking models.  Whatever dispersion is observed is reduced further when 
computed with posterior weights and clumps around about 7.4 when one focuses on the 
  31relatively likely models.  This indicates substantial robustness for the optimal rules for 
hybrids. 
This type of discussion, in which one compares the plots of unweighted and 
posterior weighted results, with further attention to the relatively likely models, enables a 
policymaker to get a good overview of the risk dispersion it must face and whether it is 
caused by models that are supported by the data in the sense that their posterior weights 
are relatively high.  As such, this discussion suggests potential ways of dealing with 
critiques of the minimax criterion as being too fragile in the sense that it is influenced far 
too much by models that have extremely small probabilities either in a posterior sense or 
in some judgmental sense.   The performance of the minimax criterion might be 
improved by applying it to a data determined “trimmed” subset of the possible models, 
e.g. the subset consisting of the 1/20 of the likeliest that we have employed.   This same 
argument might be applied with profit to any criterion that can be unduly influenced by 
models with small “believability” whether believability is measured by posterior 





  We finally note that there exists an interesting pattern that relates model 
complexity (in our context, length of lags) and the policy parameters. As indicated in 
Figure 3, while there is weak association between the total complexity of a model and the 
associated parameters, relatively strong patterns emerge when one considers IS curve 
complexity (the number of lags in eq. (18)) and with Phillips curve complexity (the 
number of lags in (19)). For backward looking models, the magnitude of   decreases in 
IS complexity but increases in PC complexity.  The magnitude of   is decreasing with 
respect to both IS and PC complexity.   
i g
y g
Different patterns emerge for the hybrid models.  For this model class, one finds 
that  increases in IS complexity.  The   parameter is increasing in both IS and PC  i g y g
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13Giacomo Rondina has greatly helped us in identifying these patterns. complexity.  These patterns are the opposite of what holds for the backwards-looking 
model. 
  These systematic pattern relationships for backwards-looking and hybrid models 
suggest some interesting avenues for future research.  One question is whether these 
patterns are sensitive to the choices of  i λ  and  y λ . A second broader question concerns 
the existence of patterns for more complex versions of the policy rule, such as rules 
which allow for policy lags beyond a single period.  Brock and Durlauf (2004b) shows 
how, when control is costless, as the number of lags in the policy rule is allowed to 
become arbitrarily long, the variation in the state variables of a system is reduced to the 
variation of the i.i.d. drivers of the system.  We conjecture that this also holds when the 
cost of control is small, i.e.  i λ  is much smaller than  y λ  in the current context. Hence a 
system in which the number of control parameters is highly restricted will not be able to 
achieve the Brock and Durlauf (2004b) reduction to fundamental i.i.d. shocks.  The more 
complex the state equation, the greater the implicit restrictions on a simple rule such as 
(17) and hence the greater the “strain” on the rule to achieve this limit.  We conjecture 
that there is something analogous to a Le Chatelier principle that produces a relationship 
between the Taylor parameters as the complexity of the state equation increases. 
 
 
IV. Interpretation  
  
In this section we consider some interpretations of our results in the context of an 
abstract dynamic system.  We consider the backwards-looking class of models. This 
system is one dimensional, unlike the system we have studied empirically; we employ a 
one dimensional system as closed forms solutions are straightforward to develop for this 
case whereas for higher dimensional cases they are far more complicated and lead to a 
loss of intuition.  Let  t x  denote the state of the system and   denote the scalar control 
available to the policymaker.  The state evolves according to 
t u
 
  ( ) ( ) 11 tt t xa L x b L u t ξ −− = ++  (28) 
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where the Wold representation of  t ξ  is denoted 
 
  ( ) t wL t ξ ν =  (29) 
 




  ( ) 1 t ug L x 1 t − − =−  (30) 
 
and chooses a feedback rule in order to minimize 
 
   (31) 




We now consider a special case of this model:  0 λ = ,  and  ( ) 1 wL= .  For this class of 
models, the optimal choice
14 of  ( ) ( )
* gL g L = will fulfill 
 






== + (32) 
 
 
Eq. (32) is useful because it illustrates the basic Taylor principle for stabilization policy.  







=+ =+ . Relative to the model in Section III, one can equate  t x  with 
inflation and   with the nominal interest rate.  The Taylor principle is  , so that 
inflation innovations get greater weight than output innovations.  By analogy, we have 
t u y gg π >
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14This finding is standard; we refer the reader to Brock and Durlauf (2004b) for a 
rigorous development of necessity and sufficiency arguments for models of this type. the same tendency to react relatively strongly to inflation. For our special case, the 








>  the feedback is more than one to one.  This seems an empirically 
plausible case given the high persistence in the inflation series. One could also argue that 
Friedman’s classic (1948) concern about long and variable lags is interpretable as 
suggesting that the feedback polynomial  ( ) bL is not that persistent. 
  This model may be used to illustrate the concepts of outcome dispersion and 
action dispersion we have described in Section III.vi.  In doing this, we will ignore 
parameter uncertainty.  We first consider the case where the optimal policy is not 
constrained in terms of numbers of lags.  Let the model space M  be defined as  
 
  ( ) ( ) {, ,, } M aLm bLm =  (33) 
 
Where   and   denote model-specific lag polynomials.  In our analysis, we 
considered a set of 64 different models for the model space (33).  Each model is 
associated with a distinct fundamental driver 
( , aLm ) ) ( , bLm
, mt ν  with variance 
2
m v σ .  
 If  , outcome dispersion is generated by cross-section variation in  ()1 wL=
2
m v σ , 
recalling our assumption that the lag length for the policy rule is not constrained.  The 
model-specific optimal rule eliminates all dependence in the state.  Action dispersion in 
this case refers to the variance of  , the coefficient associated with   in  . For 





( ) , aLm and  ( ) , bLm, there will is an 
associated  , hence 
*
j  may vary across models even if the outcome dispersion 
does not.  The variance of 
*
j g  can be written
()
* gL g
 as  
 
  ( ) () ( )
* var var 1 , j j gd L =+ m  (34) 
 
  35In this expression  .  () () j j rL r =
  These calculations assume that a policymaker may choose any lag length for the 
feedback rule.  One may ask similar questions about outcome and action dispersion when 
policymakers are required to choose rules with restrictions on lag length; in fact many of 
the “simple” rules that have been considered in recent monetary research, of which the 
Taylor rule is a leading example, in fact do this.  From the perspective of model 
uncertainty in lag structure, these simple rules run the risk of being unable to counter 
longer-run feedbacks.  
To understand the costs of overly simple rules, we consider the case   and  
.  Suppose that the true model is one where the lag structure for   contains N 
lags.  If one were to consider a sequence of optimal rules, in which the k’th rule is 
constrained to only have k lags, then it is easy to see that the value of   obtainable 
with a  -lag rule is decreasing (in k) and will, when 
()1 wL=
1 b = () aL
2 Ex
k kN =  equal 
2
ν σ .  This simple logic 
is suggestive of the factors that will determine the outcome dispersion for a model space 
of the form  () {, , } M aLm b = .  If the set of possible policy rules allows for lags lengths 
up to N, then the minimum outcome dispersion may be obtained for every model in M. 
  This basic argument has an important implication for outcome dispersion and 
model uncertainty: outcome dispersion will decline to 0 as the number of lags in the 
policy rule space increases.  Conversely, if one defines a complexity gap as the difference 
between the number of lags in the state equation and the number of lags in the policy 
rule, one would expect the estimated risk to be increasing in this gap. The dispersion 
plots for minimum risk in Figure 2 appear to possess this property.  This is so because we 
optimized over parameters for the single-lag structure where the total number of lags in 
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  In this paper, we have attempted to outline some basic principles for incorporating 
model uncertainty into the reporting of policy evaluation exercises.  We have argued that 
the policy analysis should not be done conditional on a specific model but rather should 
reflect model uncertainty.  This leads to model averaging methods that treat model 
specification as an unobservable in a way parallel to any other type of unknown in data 
analysis. We have applied these ideas to some monetary policy exercises.  These 
exercises suggest that the Taylor rule has good robustness properties.  These analyses 
also suggest some ways to visualize the role of model uncertainty which may facilitate 
communication with policymakers.  
  To be clear, our analysis really only scratches the surface of the many questions 
that arise when model uncertainty is incorporated into policy exercises.  One important 
question is how to operationalize our approach to richer model spaces, such as spaces 
which incorporate various types of learning and nonlinearity.  Another question concerns 
the appropriate specification of prior probabilities on model spaces for macroeconomic 
contexts such as monetary policy evaluation.  Perhaps most important, our analysis 
describes uncertainty for a fixed model space.  Since progress in economic research 
should have the effect of expanding the space over time, this expansion should be 
incorporated into any decision problem. It might well also be the case that the choice of 
rules should reflect the implications of a rule for how information about a model space is 
produced. All of these questions suggest that model uncertainty research should prove an 
active area of study. Table 1 
 
Parameter Estimates for Models with Highest Posterior 
 
A. IS curve 
 
  αy1 
 
αy2 αy3 αr   2 R  D.W.  s.e. 









  0.89  2.03  0.78 




n.a.  0.13 
(0.03) 
  0.89  2.06  0.77 
 
 
B. Phillips curve 
 
  βy1 
 
βπ1 βπ2 βπ3 β0
2 R  D.W.  s.e. 









n.a.  0.83  2.09  1.07 
Hybrid  0.14 
(0.04) 
1.00  n.a.  n.a.  0.32 
(0.07) 





1. Panel A presents estimates of equation (19), panel B estimates of (20).  Constant terms 
were included in all regressions.  The backward and hybrid models differ in their 
treatment of expected inflation, as explained in the text. 
 
2.  In panel A, the output gap is the dependent variable, αyj is the coefficient on output 
gap at lag j, αr the coefficient on the annual real interest rate.  In panel B, inflation is the 
dependent variable, βy1 is the coefficient on yt-1, βπj the coefficient on inflation at lag j, β0 
the coefficient on a survey measure of expected annual inflation. 
 
3. The data are quarterly.  The sample of 131 observations is 1970:2-2002:4.  Inflation is 
the annualized change in the GDP deflator; the output gap is computed from real GDP 
and the CBO estimate of potential GDP; the interest rate is the average Federal funds 
rate. 
  38Table 2 
 
Relative Likelihood  P 
 
  Backward Hybrid  
(1)Minimum P  1×10
-7 2×10
-6  
(2)Q1 P  2×10
-5 2×10
-4  
(3)Median P  3×10
-4 1×10
-3  
(4)Q3 P  2×10
-3 9×10
-3  
(5)Maximum P  0.30  0.30   
(6)No. models with P > (max P)/20  8  13   
(7)Sum of P for models with  
P> (max P)/20 
0.92  0.89   
(8)Sum of P for models in top quartile  0.98  0.93   



















where the summation runs over the 64 models in a given class (backwards or hybrid).  As 
indicated in line (9), by construction ΣmΡm=1.  
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Table 3 
Risk and Model Uncertainty for Original Taylor Rule 
  
Taylor Rule: gπ=1.5, gy=0.5, gi=0 
 
A. All Models 
  Backwards Hybrids 
(1)Mean 30.0  25.6 
(2)Std. Dev.  10.9  7.1 
(3)Minimum 17.5  12.5 
(4)Q1 20.2  20.1 
(5)Median 26.3  26.0 
(6)Q3 36.5  30.8 
(7)Maximum 51.6  44.7 
(8)Post. Weighted Av.  22.0  23.6 
 
B. Models with High Posterior Probability 
 
(1)Minimum                   19.1     15.2 




1. This table presents information on the distribution across the 64 models in a given class 
(backward looking or hybrid) of risk R when monetary policy follows Taylor (1993) rule given 
in the header of the table. 
 
2. The risk function is given in (18), R = var(π∞) + λyvar(y∞) + λivar(∆i∞), for λy=1.0 and λi=0.1.  
 
3. In panel B, “high” posterior probability is defined as having a BIC adjusted likelihood at least 






Table 4  
 
Ratio of Risk from Taylor (1993) Rule to Risk from Optimized Rules 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Class of models 







Unstable = 5.0 
Ratios for 






0.55 0.56  0.61  135 
(2) Backward 
(Optimal Hybrid) 
0.75 0.77  0.80  107 
(3) Hybrid 
(Optimal Hybrid) 
0.32 0.32  0.32  n.a. 
(4) Hybrid 
(Optimal Backward) 




1. This table presents the posterior weighted average ratios of risk R when monetary policy 
follows the Taylor (1993) rule to risk when monetary policy follows certain optimized rules. 
These optimized rules set the interest rate i as in (17), it = gππt + gyyt + giit-1. The parameters  gπ, 
gy and gi are chosen to minimize risk R given the estimates of the IS and Phillips curves 
presented in Table 1 above. Denote risk from Taylor (1993) rule as  ˆ R T and risk from an 
optimized rule as  ˆ R O, then the posterior weighted average ratio is: 
Σm∈CPm ( ˆ R O/ ˆ R T ) 
 
2. Lines (1) and (2) report the average ratio for the backward models using the optimized rule for 
the likeliest backward model (in line (1)) and the optimized rule for the likeliest hybrid model (in 
line (2)). Similarly, lines (3) and (4) report the average ratio for the hybrid models using the 
optimized rule for the likeliest hybrid model (in line (3)) and the optimized rule for the likeliest 
backward model (in line (4)). 
 
3. Column (1) reports average ratios when unstable models are omitted from the calculation. 
Column (2) and (3) report average ratio when the risk assigned to unstable models is so that their 
ratio to Taylor (1993) is 5.0 (column (2)) and 20.0 (column (3)). 
 
4. Column (4) reports the ratios that have to be assigned to unstable models in order to obtain an 
average ratio equal to 1.0, meaning that the Taylor (1993) rule is equivalent to the optimized rule 




  41Figure 1 
Ratios of Risk for Optimal Policy Rules over Original Taylor Rule 





















































































































































(4) Optimal Backward Rule  (3) Optimal Hybrid Rule 
(2) Optimal Hybrid Rule  (1) Optimal Backward Rule  
Notes:  
 
1. This figure presents the ratio of risk R when monetary policy follows the Taylor (1993) rule to 
risk when monetary policy follows certain optimized rules. These optimized rules set the interest 
rate i as in (17), it = gππt + gyyt + giit-1. The parameters  gπ, gy and gi are chosen to minimize risk 
R given the estimates of the IS and Phillips curves presented in Table 1 above. 
 
2. The policy rules are: 
Original Taylor Rule: gπ=1.5, gy=0.5, gi=0 
Optimized 3 Variable Backward: gπ=3.2, gy=2.1, gi=0.2 
Optimized 3 Variable Hybrid: gπ=3.2, gy=4.7, gi=0.55. 
 
3. In panels A the denominator is the risk R obtained applying Taylor (1993) rule to backward 
models: in (1) the numerator is the risk obtained using the optimized rule for the likeliest 
backward model; in (3) the numerator is the risk obtained using the optimized rule for the 
likeliest hybrid model.  
  42  43
In the panels B the denominator is the risk R obtained applying Taylor (1993) rule to hybrid 
models: in  panel (2) the numerator is the risk obtained using the optimized rule for the likeliest 
backward model; in (4) the numerator is the risk obtained using the optimized rule for the 
likeliest hybrid model. In either case, the ratios are computed using the IS and Phillips curve 
estimates of 64 models in each class. See Appendix 1 for a mapping of the model numbers to 
details of specification of IS and Phillips curves. 
 
4. A ratio less than one means that the optimized rule delivers less risk than did the original 
(1993) Taylor rule. If the optimized rule led to instability, the ratio is truncated at 1.8. The 
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Table 5 
 
Risk Distributions Across Models: 
 

























(1)Mean 30.0 16.0 0.55 25.6  6.7  0.28 
(2)Std.  Dev.  10.9  5.7 0.022 7.1  0.5 0.073 
(3)Minimum  17.5 9.2 0.51  12.5 5.7 0.15 
(4)Q1  20.2 11.2 0.54 20.1  6.2  0.22 
(5)Median  26.3 13.1 0.55 26.0  6.7  0.27 
(6)Q3  36.5 18.7 0.56 30.9  6.9  0.33 
(7)Maximum  51.6 28.1 0.61 44.7  7.6  0.46 
  
B. Models with High Posterior Probability 
  Backward (8 models)  Hybrid (13 models) 
(1)Minimum  19.1 10.3 0.53 15.2  6.3  0.23 
(2)Maximum  23.2 13.1 0.59 31.9  7.6  0.42 
 
  
C. Model with Highest Posterior Probability 
  Backward   Hybrid  




1. The policy rules are: 
Original Taylor Rule: gπ=1.5, gy=0.5, gi=0 
Optimized 3 Variable Backward: gπ=3.2, gy=2.1, gi=0.2 
Optimized 3 Variable Hybrid: gπ=3.2, gy=4.7, gi=0.55. 
 
2. The assumed monetary policy rule is given in (17), it = gππt + gyyt + giit-1.  The risk function is 
given in (18), R = var(π∞) + λyvar(y∞) + λivar(∆i∞), for λy=1.0 and λi=0.1.  
 
3. In panel B, “high” posterior probability is defined as having a BIC adjusted likelihood at least 
1/20 of the model with the highest BIC adjusted likelihood. 
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 Table 6 
 
Distribution of Optimal Policy Parameters and Risks Across Models 
 
A. All Models 
 
 Backward    Hybrid 
  gπ/(1-gi)  gy/(1-gi)  gi R   gπ/(1-gi)  gy/(1-gi)  gi R 
(1)Mean 3.4  2.4  0.2  16.3    3.2  5.0  0.56  6.6 
(2)Std. Dev.  0.3  0.5  0.1  5.9    0.4  0.6  0.03  0.6 
(3)Minimum 2.9  1.5  0.0  8.8    2.3  3.7  0.51  5.5 
(4)Q1 3.2  2.0  0.1  11.3    2.7  4.6  0.53  6.2 
(5)Median 3.4 2.3  0.2  14.6    3.0  5.0  0.57  6.8 
(6)Q3 3.6  2.7  0.3  20.2    3.1  5.5  0.57  7.0 
(7)Maximum 3.9  3.3  0.4  27.3    3.3  5.9 0.59  7.7 
 
 
B. Models with High Posterior Probability 
 
  Backward (8 models)  Hybrid (13 models) 
(1)Minimum 3.0  2.0  0.1  10.2    2.6  3.7  0.51  6.2 
(2)Maximum 3.5  2.6  0.3  13.1    3.8  5.7 0.59  7.8 
 
 
C. Model with Highest Posterior Probability 
 
 Backward  Hybrid 







1. This table presents information on the distribution across the 64 models in a given class 
(backward looking or hybrid) of monetary policy parameters  gπ, gy and gi that yielded minimum 
risk R.  The values were found by grid search over gπ, gy and gi. 
 
2. The assumed monetary policy rule is given in (17), it = gππt + gyyt + giit-1.  The risk function is 
given in (18), R = var(π∞) + λyvar(y∞) + λivar(∆i∞), for λy=1.0 and λi=0.1.  
 
3. In panel B, “high” posterior probability is defined as having a BIC adjusted likelihood at least 
1/20 of the model with the highest BIC adjusted likelihood. 
 
4.  The regression estimates for models with the highest probabilities are given in Table 1.Table 7 
 
Optimal Policy When Combining Hybrid and Backwards Models 
 
A. Policy parameters are held fixed at levels optimal for likeliest model in a given class 
 
(1) (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) (6) 
















B. Optimization over a weighted average of a single backwards and single hybrid model 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7) 
Backwards 
Weight (θ) 
gπ/(1-gi)  gy/(1-gi)  gi   Rb Rh θRb+(1-θ)Rh
0  3.2  4.7  0.55    18.3  7.6  7.6 
0.25  3.1  3.2  0.41    13.9  7.9  9.4 
0.5  3.2  2.7  0.31    13.2  8.3  10.7 
0.75  3.2  2.3  0.25    12.9  8.7  11.8 









b =12.9 and R
*
h =7.6 denote risk that obtains when the model that is likeliest 
within a given class of models is used, see Table 6.C.  In column (2) of panel A, Rh 
denotes the risk that obtains for the likeliest hybrid model (parameter estimates in Table 
1) when the policy parameters are held fixed at the values that lead to R
*
b.  By 
construction, Rh is at least as large as R
*
h.   In column (4) of panel A, Rb is similarly 
computed, using backwards model estimates presented in Table 1 and hybrid policy 
parameters presented in Table 6.C. 
 
2. Panel B present parameters that are optimal when the risk function is the indicated 
arithmetic average of backwards and hybrid models.  Risk for θ=0 and θ=1.0 corresponds 




b  in panel A. 
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Figure 2  Outcome and Action Dispersion 


















































































































Notes: The two top panels and the left bottom panel report the value of the optimal policy parameter for each model (indexed by model’s number, see Appendix 
1). The right bottom panel reports the values of the minimum risk for each model corresponding to the optimal parameters found. Risk R is calculated using 
preference values: λy = 1.0 and λi = 0.1, where R = var(π∞) + λyvar(y∞) + λivar(∆i∞). 












































































































Notes: Panels B report the same results as Panels A concerning the parameter values and the minimum risk. This time they are plotted against the relative BIC 
adjusted relative likelihood of each model. The light shaded dots refer to models having a BIC adjusted likelihood at least 1/20 of the model with the highest BIC 
adjusted likelihood. 
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Parameters Results for Hybrid Models 
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Figure 3  

























































gi dynamics – Backwards Models 
1.
2.
gπ dynamics – Backwards Models 
















































































  ───── y lags in IS   --------- π lags in PC  ————Total lags ( y in IS and π in PC) 



























































gπ dynamics – Hybrid Models 
gy dynamics – Hybrid Models 
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Appendix I 
This appendix maps the model numbers used in Figure 1 and 2 into details of 
specifications of the IS and Phillips curves. For each model number running from 1 to 64, 
three numbers are presented. These are: number of lags of y in IS curve; number of lags 
of y in Phillips curve; number of lags of π in Phillips curve. For example, model 25 had 2 
lags of y in the IS curve, along with 3 lags of y and 1 lag of π in the Phillips curve. 




y lags in IS, 
y lags and π lags in PC 
 
 
1  1 1 1  17  2 1 1  33  3 1 1  49  4 1 1 
2  1 1 2  18  2 1 2  34  3 1 2  50  4 1 2 
3  1 1 3  19  2 1 3  35  3 1 3  51  4 1 3 
4  1 1 4  20  2 1 4  36  3 1 4  52  4 1 4 
5  1 2 1  21  2 2 1  37  3 2 1  53  4 2 1 
6  1 2 2  22  2 2 2  38  3 2 2  54  4 2 2 
7  1 2 3  23  2 2 3  39  3 2 3  55  4 2 3 
8  1 2 4  24  2 2 4  40  3 2 4  56  4 2 4 
9  1 3 1  25  2 3 1  41  3 3 1  57  4 3 1 
10  1 3 2  26  2 3 2  42  3 3 2  58  4 3 2 
11  1 3 3  27  2 3 3  43  3 3 3  59  4 3 3 
12  1 3 4  28  2 3 4  44  3 3 4  60  4 3 4 
13  1 4 1  29  2 4 1  45  3 4 1  61  4 4 1 
14  1 4 2  30  2 4 2  46  3 4 2  62  4 4 2 
15  1 4 3  31  2 4 3  47  3 4 3  63  4 4 3 
16  1 4 4  32  2 4 4  48  3 4 4  64  4 4 4 
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